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The Problem of Religious
Dogmatism in Spinoza’s

Theological-Political
Treatise
Alexander Kah
Introductory Remarks

“Y

ou didn’t deserve to be born in America” were the words
with which I was condemned by a particular
fundamentalist Christian demonstrator one evening when
I attempted to engage him in friendly philosophical conversation
while attending a festival in downtown Cincinnati, Ohio. This
condemnation came in response to my question to the demonstrator
about why an all-loving God would favor the United States over
every other nation in the world. At the end of our discussion, the man
proclaimed to me that the Bible contains the answers to life’s greatest
mysteries and that the only way I could be saved from eternal
damnation was by believing in the Bible as God’s infallible, holy
Word and accepting Jesus Christ as my personal Lord and Savior.
For the sake of fairness, I promised to spend some time reading
Scripture if in return he promised to examine some philosophical
literature (Baruch Spinoza’s work was among my recommendations).
Reluctantly he obliged, but as we parted ways he remarked, “Your
philosophers don’t have all the answers!” I replied, “Exactly. And
neither do you.”
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At first, this anecdote seems trivial. The demonstrator had his
opinions, I had mine, we exchanged these opinions, and we went our
separate ways. There were times when the discussion became
intense, and there were times when the demonstrator conveyed
palpable disdain in response to my probing questions. But even
though the demonstrator advocated a radical position and his words
certainly were less than ecumenical, he did not resort to violence to
defend his beliefs. Some would argue that I should not have
approached the man at all. Sure, there are a few fundamentalists like
this man who roam the streets, but if we ignore them, they will cease
to be a nuisance. If we simply ignore fundamentalist demonstrators
(for instance, the Westboro Baptist Church), they will stop protesting
because the positive reinforcement they gain from our attention to
them will be eliminated. Seems plausible, right?
In reality, I do not believe this to be the case. Not all
fundamentalists display their faith in such a grandiose and militant
fashion as do the Westboro Baptist Church and similar groups.
Although the United States has become more secularized, there still
exists a substantial number of religious dogmatists. This is not to say
that all these people are openly violent in displaying their faith, but
these beliefs are certainly capable of inspiring contempt for fellow
citizens who are outside the faith. Additionally, dogmatism appears
in multiple forms and should not necessarily be construed as
exclusive to religion. For example, proponents of scientism also may
be deemed dogmatic. But once again, while dogmatists of this kind
typically do not spread their message through violent means either,
they still may inspire contempt for fellow citizens who do not grasp
the “truth” that they apparently hold.
Religious dogmatism, along with the contempt or outright hate
for unbelievers that it can inspire, is not just a contemporary issue.
This sociopolitical dilemma was alarmingly present during the time of
the philosopher Baruch Spinoza.
In his Theological-Political
Treatise, Spinoza first offers an account of the human condition, in
which he locates the roots of superstition. Then, Spinoza explains
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that natural superstition later can morph into dogmatism and
intolerance, which he decries. Finally, Spinoza proposes a political
project whose goal is to combat intolerance both by establishing
freedom of thought and by removing religious leaders from their
position of political authority.
I hope to answer the following research questions with my thesis:
For Spinoza, what is the relationship between reason and religion, and
how does Spinoza manage the problem of religious dogmatism?
There is evidence in the work suggesting that Spinoza writes
esoterically. How does this esotericism inform his management of
the theological-political problem?
In this paper, I will argue that Spinoza uses an esoteric strategy to
combat dogmatism. In presenting contradictory versions of the
Divine Law, he directs religion toward the political goal of social
stability and paves the way for freedom of thought. I will begin by
explaining Spinoza’s assessment of the human condition and how
superstition emerges and persists. Second, I will show how Spinoza’s
esoteric strategy informs his presentation of multiple definitions of
the Divine Law, or true religion. Third, I will explain Spinoza’s
framing of dogmatism in terms of his divorcing philosophy from
theology. Finally, I will argue that neutralizing dogmatism helps
Spinoza achieve his political goals.
The Human Condition and the Origins of Superstition
Before diagnosing the problem of dogmatism within a Spinozistic
framework, it is necessary to understand Spinoza’s assessment of the
human condition, which complements his conjectures regarding the
origins of superstition. In this section, I will discuss first the interplay
between Spinoza’s conception of the human condition and the origins
of superstition. I will focus on two key attributes of superstition that
can be derived from Spinoza’s account: its naturalness and its
permanence. Then, in the following section, I will discuss Spinoza’s
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distinction between superstition and “true religion,” and how the two
are related.
From the outset of the Theological-Political Treatise (TTP),
Spinoza paints a bleak portrait of humanity’s natural state. He states,
If men were able to exercise complete control over all their
circumstances, or if continuous good fortune were always
their lot, they would never be prey to superstition. But since
they are often reduced to such straits as to be without any
resource, and their immoderate greed for fortune’s fickle
favours often makes them the wretched victims of alternating
hopes and fears, the result is that, for the most part, their
credulity knows no bounds. In critical times they are swayed
this way or that by the slightest impulse, especially so when
they are wavering between the emotions of hope and fear; yet
at other times they are overconfident, boastful and arrogant. 1
Already, one can see Spinoza’s connection of the human condition
and superstition as he locates the origins of the latter in human
ignorance or “credulity.” Not understanding natural phenomena,
human beings invent the notion of “fortune” because they do not
know what will take place in the future. Lamentably, human beings’
ignorance causes their susceptibility to “alternating hopes and fears,”
which, along with a lack of “control over all their circumstances,”
renders them “prey to superstition.” Due to ignorance, the passions
come to dominate humanity. Spinoza elaborates on this ignorance of
the causes of natural events: “[T]here is no end to the kind of omens
that they imagine, and they read extraordinary things into Nature as if
the whole of Nature were a partner in their madness.”2 Here Spinoza
claims that in their ignorance human beings tend to think about
natural events anthropocentrically, conceiving of “Nature” as a
“partner,” an agent of some kind. Spinoza considers this ignorance a
precursor to superstition, as the passions of hope and fear color
people’s judgments of natural events. Thus, in Spinoza’s view,
ignorance with regard to nature and the subsequent dominance of the
passions lays the foundation for superstition.
80
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Spinoza’s pessimism about the human condition is elaborated in
Chapter 16. He argues, “[N]ot all men are naturally determined to act
in accordance with the rules and laws of reason. On the contrary, all
men are born in a state of complete ignorance . . . [and] they have to
live . . . by the urging of appetite alone, for Nature has given them
nothing else and has denied them the actualised power to live
according to sound reason.” 3 Spinoza reaffirms the dominance of the
passions, or “appetite,” over reason: Human beings by nature are
primarily irrational.
This passage also hints at Spinoza’s
determinism. A critical way that human beings are in “complete
ignorance” is that they do not understand fully that “all individual
things are determined to exist and to act in a definite way.” 4 Again,
Spinoza emphasizes that the influence of the passions coupled with
ignorance naturally promotes superstitious thinking.
Spinoza wants to emphasize that both ignorance and the passions
are the cause of superstitious thinking. At times, his deterministic
comments suggest that superstition stems from an intellectual
misunderstanding of the workings of nature. While this may be true
to some extent, superstition is rooted deeply in the passions, by
which, Spinoza claims, all people are influenced in varying degrees
(as some are more rational and can mitigate the influence of the
passions): “It is fear, then, that engenders, preserves, and fosters
superstition . . . [Thus,] it clearly follows that all men are by nature
liable to superstition . . . For it arises not from reason but from
emotion, and emotion of the most powerful kind.” 5 For Spinoza,
“emotion” dominates the human psyche. As he locates the origins of
superstition in “fear,” an “emotion of the most powerful kind,” it
follows that the prevalence of fear will lead to the prevalence of
superstition.
To support this claim, Spinoza draws on historical examples. For
instance, Spinoza reminds readers that Alexander the Great, in the
midst of military defeat and illness, was incited to “employ seers.”6
According to Curtius, Alexander was filled with great fear when
placed in tangibly dangerous situations, and as a result, he sought the
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counsel of “seers,” who likely knew no more about the causes of
natural events than he did. With this example, Spinoza illustrates that
the predisposition to superstition due to the dominance of the passions
occurs even in some of the most powerful and rational figures in
history. On the other side of this coin—and arguably more important,
because political leaders’ manipulation of theological leaders for selfbenefit and to inspire fear is one aspect of the theological-political
problem that Spinoza is trying to solve—Alexander the Great preyed
on his subjects’ fears and thus on their superstitious tendencies.
Spinoza claims that rulers like Alexander “to render themselves
secure . . . tried to persuade men that they were descended from
immortal gods, thinking that if only their subjects and all men should
regard them not as their equals but should believe them to be gods,
they would willingly suffer their rule and would readily submit.”7
Alexander proclaimed himself as a descendant of the “immortal gods”
for the sake of the security of his position of power. His subjects,
moved by their passions and likely influenced further by the rhetoric
of theological leaders, feared Alexander as a deity and hoped for his
divine blessing. This practice gets at the heart of Spinoza’s political
project to reduce the influence of religious figures on the populace.
As we will see, Spinoza views these political motives as misguided:
Theocracy propagates dogmatism, which is exactly what Spinoza is
attempting to alleviate.
Spinoza goes so far as to claim that the emotions of hope and fear
constitute the sole basis of superstition. Spinoza acknowledges that
religion has played a role in fueling superstitious thinking, but
religion cannot be regarded as the basis of superstition. He writes,
“[O]nly while fear persists do men fall prey to superstition, that all the
objects of religious reverence have been no more than phantoms, the
delusions springing from despondency and timidity.” 8 While people
superstitiously treat some things and people as “objects of religious
reverence,” Spinoza argues that the superstition stems not from the
objects themselves but instead from “despondency and timidity.”
Human beings are slaves to fortune, and superstition is driven by the
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fear of the unknown. Spinoza adds that superstition does not stem
from “a confused idea of a deity possessed by all mortals.” 9 Spinoza
seems to use the word “idea” in a Cartesian sense, signifying an
innate concept which has been formulated through reason. As
previously stated, Spinoza believes that a misuse of reason may
promote superstition, but superstition is ultimately rooted in the
passions. On these grounds, Spinoza dismisses as a viable candidate
for the basis of superstition the content of innate religious beliefs.
Religion, then, is neither the equivalent nor the basis of superstition,
although it has played a significant part in promoting superstition.
Again, Spinoza wishes to highlight the natural origins of superstition
in the human condition. This is significant because as we will see, the
naturalness of superstition is an obstacle around which Spinoza must
work in implementing his political project.
In addition to explaining superstition as a natural phenomenon,
Spinoza also discusses superstition’s relative permanence.
Unfortunately, this susceptibility to superstition is difficult and often
impossible to shake, according to Spinoza. He writes,
I know how deeply rooted in the mind are the prejudices
embraced under the guise of piety. I know, too, that the
masses can no more be freed from their superstition than
from their fears. Finally, I know that they are unchanging in
their obstinacy, that they are not guided by reason, and that
their praise and blame is at the mercy of impulse. 10
Spinoza makes several claims in this passage. First, he acknowledges
that people have “prejudices” that are “deeply rooted.” In this case,
Spinoza seems to be referring to religious prejudices, but as he has
argued before, superstitions promoted by religion are rooted
ultimately in the human condition. Spinoza then goes on to claim that
the multitude (“the masses”) cannot be “freed from their
superstition.” This sentence is Spinoza’s most direct assertion of the
permanence of superstition. Because it is rooted in their “fears,” and
fear is a natural and dominant emotion, superstition reigns supreme
for the vast majority of people. Finally, Spinoza argues that the
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multitude is “obstinate,” “not guided by reason,” and “at the mercy of
impulse.”
In Spinoza’s view, people grow accustomed to
superstitious thinking; so, human beings are predisposed naturally to
adopt superstitious thinking, and their aversion to change facilitates
the persistence of superstition throughout life. Thus, superstition
persists not only as the result of innate fears, but also as a result of
human beings’ unwillingness to critically examine and change their
thinking patterns when superstition has already taken root. This
consideration plays a significant role in Spinoza’s political project
because, assuming his theory of superstition is correct, it would be
more feasible for political leaders to re-channel the superstitious
thinking of the multitude for the betterment of the state rather than try
to eradicate superstition once and for all.
Spinoza’s Two Versions of “Divine Law” and Esotericism
Because superstition is such a fundamental and malignant
condition, Spinoza takes considerable care to set it apart from what he
considers to be “true religion.” Spinoza proclaims that “[true]
religion stands in no need of the trappings of superstition. On the
contrary, its glory is diminished when it is embellished with such
fancies.” 11 Spinoza’s statement implies that religion is something of
value. It is Spinoza’s aim to rescue religion from corruption and
harmonize it with the well-being of the state. Spinoza also asserts
that “true religion” is “divinely inscribed . . . in men’s minds.” 12 True
religion is innate; on the other hand, the “trappings” of corrupted
religion are artificial and play on people’s natural fears, which results
in superstitious thinking.
True religion and superstition are
diametrically opposed.
Despite his insistence on the inherent goodness of true religion,
Spinoza does not always define true religion consistently in the TTP.
Spinoza often uses the term “Divine Law” to signify true religion.
Spinoza presents his first formulation of the Divine Law in Chapter
Four. He distinguishes between “human law” and “divine law,”
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stating, “By human law I mean a prescribed rule of conduct whose
sole aim is to safeguard life and the commonwealth; by divine law I
mean that which is concerned only with the supreme good, that is, the
true knowledge and love of God.” 13 It is important to note that here
Spinoza defines “human law” in terms of morality and social stability
but defines “divine law” in terms of the intellect.
Of great relevance to this first version of the Divine Law is
Spinoza’s identification of God with Nature:
By God’s direction I mean the fixed and immutable order of
Nature, or chain of natural events; for I have said above…that
the universal laws of Nature according to which all things
happen and are determined are nothing but God’s eternal
decrees, which always involve eternal truth and necessity. So
it is the same thing whether we say that all things happen
according to Nature’s laws or that they are regulated by
God’s decree and direction. 14
God and Nature are identical in Spinoza’s account. It follows from
this that divine laws are the same as natural laws. Therefore, the first
version of the Divine Law that Spinoza presents in this chapter can be
summarized as the comprehension of natural events.
We may recall that in the preface Spinoza characterizes the
multitude as primarily irrational and bound by superstition. It is
curious, then, that true religion would consist in the “knowledge and
love of God,” which can only be apprehended through “philosophic
thinking and pure activity of mind.” 15 It is strange that Spinoza
seems to set such an unattainable end for true religion. The
multitude, in his view, is obstinate and not predisposed to
“philosophic thinking and pure activity of mind”; rather, most people
are predisposed to superstitious thinking due to their natural
ignorance and fear. It would be naïve to leap to the conclusion that
Spinoza has contradicted himself unwittingly by setting such a high
standard. But, this is neither the only nor the final version of the
Divine Law that Spinoza presents in the treatise.
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Spinoza reformulates the Divine Law in Chapter 12 of the TTP.
He begins the chapter with an attack on proponents of Biblical
infallibility. For Spinoza, “God’s eternal Word” is not constituted by
a holy book alone, and he criticizes those who maintain the
infallibility of holy books as such: “[They] are carrying their piety too
far, and are turning religion into superstition; instead of God’s Word
they are beginning to worship likenesses and images, that is, paper
and ink.” 16 True religion is not dependent on “paper and ink,” but
many prefer to think that this is the case. As a result, religion has
degenerated into superstition because the true message has been lost.
In light of this attack, Spinoza revisits the concept of the Divine
Law, or true religion. Spinoza has not lost all hope for Scripture to be
instructive and constructive. While he expresses his skepticism with
regard to Biblical authorship and warns against worshipping “paper
and ink,” he stresses the truth of Scripture’s overarching message.
Spinoza argues that Scripture is holy only insofar as “its message
[is]…to love God above all, and one’s neighbour as oneself.” 17 For
Spinoza, true religion boils down to “the doctrine of charity.”18 The
minutiae of a particular holy book are of no concern to Spinoza
because they are not sufficient for the existence of true religion.
Moral action, then, is the essence of true religion.
This is an interesting change in tone from Spinoza's assertions in
the fourth chapter that true religion consists in intellectual love and
knowledge of God. The shift likely is purposeful. It can be argued
that in the expression of his ideas, Spinoza uses language or appeals
to a tradition that his audience is familiar with and can better
understand. In this way, Spinoza’s writing may at times be
considered esoteric, in the sense that his message is disguised by a
common language or tradition. Bagley goes even farther to argue that
Spinoza’s method is deliberately deceptive. 19 Citing as a key
example Spinoza’s “inconsistency” with regard to the validity of
knowledge derived from revelation, Bagley asserts that “the esoteric
or true teaching of the Tractatus theologico-politicus often amounts to
the realization that the doctrine asserted most conspicuously is
86
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exoterical or untrue, as is the case with the claim that what is attained
from prophecy or revelation offers an assured disclosure of some
‘certa cognitio.’” 20 In other words, Spinoza may be conveying an
esoteric message that is antithetical to the message gleaned from a
superficial reading of the treatise.
It is likely not the case that Spinoza is adapting his diction and
appealing to tradition solely for the sake of accessibility. To a certain
extent, Spinoza is intentionally inaccessible from the outset of the
work. In keeping with his pessimistic attitude toward the multitude,
he “prefer[s] that they disregard this book completely” because they
will “misinterpret” it.21 While this remark may not be sufficient to
deter certain people from reading the treatise, it is still illustrative of
his intentions. On the other hand, it is conceivable that this serves as
a ploy to induce critical thinkers to read further, acting as an
invitation for those capable of philosophy to think critically.
Spinoza adds that at the time of his writing philosophy is not
“liberal” enough, as the majority attempt to make it the “handmaiden
of theology.” 22 Spinoza thus addresses the treatise not to the general
public, but to those who try constantly to assert the primacy of
theology over philosophy. The Preface seems to be the most
forthright section of the work; however, the Preface simultaneously
makes Spinoza less accessible as evidenced by the fact that he limits
his audience significantly. Spinoza does not intend to be accessible to
all, but he may want to attract potential philosophers to his cause.
The contradictions in the work may be reflective of his intentions.
The tension between the two versions of Divine Law that Spinoza
presents in the TTP may be viewed as less contradictory when taking
Spinoza’s political project into account. Rice states that Spinoza’s
primary goal in the treatise is the complete “freedom of
philosophizing” because “[f]reeing human society from the burden of
religious dogmatism opens the door to a pluralistic view of human
cognition and the liberation of human science.” 23 This “human
science” of which Rice speaks in actuality sounds similar to
Spinoza’s first framing of true religion as the intellectual knowledge
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and love of God, as Spinoza takes God to mean Nature. In this way,
the pursuit of natural science is true religion; however, Spinoza’s
negative view of human nature seems to preclude this possibility.
Nevertheless, Rice provides another insight that is integral to
reconciling the apparent contradiction in Spinoza’s two versions of
Divine Law, claiming that “superstition [is propagated by] the
transformation of religion from practical to speculative doctrine. This
distinction between religion and superstition becomes a cornerstone
of Spinoza’s argument for academic freedom in TTP.” 24 Here Rice
reiterates that Spinoza distinguishes between superstition and true
religion. Superficially it seems that Spinoza’s first version of the
Divine Law is a “speculative doctrine,” but interpreting God to mean
Nature changes the meaning of the first version entirely: Instead of
true religion consisting in speculation about the God of Scripture, it
actually consists in the comprehension of natural events through
reason. Spinoza then proposes a “practical doctrine” in the second
version of the Divine Law, the aforementioned “doctrine of charity.”
Loving one’s neighbor, then, is true religion, as well, and one can see
easily how this would be beneficial politically. Interpreting the two
versions of the Divine Law in this manner allows Spinoza to have his
cake and eat it too, so to speak. The first version allows for Spinoza’s
political goal of “academic freedom” by sanctioning the practice of
natural science. The second version both keeps religion from
becoming speculative and devolving into superstition (or at least rechannels the superstitious thinking of the multitude) and
accommodates the multitude by giving them practical rules to follow.
Levy puts this in another way. He writes that for Spinoza the
purpose of religion is “to educate the citizens toward obedience . . .
by appealing to understanding, but not by coercion.”25 The multitude
can be persuaded to understand that the message of Scripture is to
love one another. “Education” implies refinement of reason and
desires, which is consistent with Spinoza’s first version of Divine
Law, which is framed in terms of the intellect. Religion does not
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relinquish its practical purpose either, as it inspires the public’s
“obedience” to the sovereign power without resorting to force.
I suspect that the second version of the Divine Law is Spinoza’s
way of coming down to earth, so to speak. It seems that a secure and
stable society would be a necessary precondition for the open and free
refinement of the intellect. Given his view of human nature, it seems
that Spinoza is conceding that his political project—of which
intellectual freedom26 is a crucial part—will involve re-channeling
superstition rather than eradicating it completely. To a great extent,
the second version of the Divine Law can be understood as a
precondition for the first version. Even though the multitude’s
superstition and their common ground (i.e., Scripture) are not
destroyed outright, the meaning of Scripture is limited significantly
insofar as it cannot contradict the doctrine of charity. While it can be
objected that this is detrimental to freedom in general, the limitation
of Scriptural meaning paves the way for philosophers like Spinoza to
engage in free inquiry more or less safely.
Spinoza’s esoteric strategy is manifested in his ability to present
seemingly contradictory conceptions of Divine Law or true religion as
if their coexistence poses no problem. Vigilant readers will notice
that Spinoza asserts that true religion is housed in the mind innately,
which is where ignorance and the domineering passions also reside
innately. This cohabitation seems impossible given Spinoza’s view
of the human condition. The irrational multitude cannot be expected
to attain knowledge of God. As suggested above, the esoteric truth of
the first version of the Divine Law seems to be the comprehension of
natural events, given Spinoza’s pantheistic doctrine.
A reexamination of the second version of Divine Law proves
equally fruitful. The doctrine of charity that Spinoza proposes is
metaphysically groundless. If God and Nature are one, there is no
divine command to love one another and humans can be viewed as
machines driven by their passions. However, Spinoza does not
expect any religious believers reading his treatise to notice this
inconsistency. The esoteric truth of the second version of the Divine
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Law may be that the state’s health is contingent on the citizens’ love
of one another. Jobani goes even farther to argue that the political is
in tension with the ethical and the former supersedes the latter in
Spinoza’s project: “Obedience to God, which in the first part of the
Treatise was identified only with ‘love of [one’s] neighbor,’ is
identified in the second part with blind obedience to the political
authority.” 27 In Jobani’s account, Spinoza uses “obedience to God”
as a political tool, at least in the section of the work where he presents
his political project. In effect, Spinoza esoterically declares religion
as a means to a healthy state.
As we have seen, Spinoza invests a considerable amount of effort
in the TTP assessing the human condition and locating the origins of
superstition within it. From Spinoza’s claims it may be deduced that
superstition is a natural and permanent condition. The naturalness
and permanence of superstition is a function of the naturalness and
permanence of ignorance and, more important, the dominance of the
passions (e.g., fear). Because superstition is so deep-seated and
persistent, it is one of the greatest obstacles to a healthy state.
Spinoza’s conception of true religion provides a healthy alternative
because it demands that people love one another. In Spinoza’s view,
true religion becomes imperative for a healthy state because of the
widespread peace it promotes. Even if people choose to hold on to
extraneous superstitions (as the enlightenment of the multitude is
likely impossible), as long as they hold the belief that others should
be treated in the same way that they would want to be treated, the
state can function well or flourish. These considerations pave the
way for a discussion of how Spinoza frames religious dogmatism and
its political implications.
The Roles of Philosophy and Theology: A Spinozistic Framing of
Dogmatism
In the Preface of the TTP, Spinoza criticizes those who try to
make philosophy the “handmaiden of theology” and surmises that
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they “will derive great profit from this work.”28 For Spinoza,
philosophy and theology (which also will be called reason and
religion, respectively, in this section) both have important roles to
play in society, and he cautions against their interference with one
another. Spinoza elaborates on this theme in Chapter 15, which has
the effect of clarifying his views on dogmatism.
Spinoza argues vehemently against the view that we can make
theology consistent with philosophy, and vice-versa. With respect to
the first alternative, this adaptation is not possible because “Scripture
teaches only piety, not philosophy, and . . . all its contents were
adapted to the understanding and preconceived beliefs of the common
people.” 29 This assertion is reminiscent of Spinoza’s second version
of Divine Law insofar as “piety” consists in moral action (i.e., loving
one’s neighbor). “Philosophy” can be taken to mean the investigation
and comprehension of Nature, the freedom for which is allowed by
his first version of Divine Law. With respect to the second
alternative—that is, that philosophy can be adapted to theology—
Spinoza warns that if this were possible, we would have to “accept as
divinely inspired utterances the prejudices of a common people of
long ago, which [would] gain a hold on [our] understanding and
darken it.” 30 These admonitions serve to illustrate Spinoza’s views
about the limited knowledge of the Biblical authors and, in turn, about
proponents of superstition. Spinoza clearly does not take Scripture as
literal truth, and he warns that others doing so is pernicious.
Dogmatists uphold these “divinely inspired utterances” that comprise
Scripture and have no qualms about spreading them as truth. Spinoza
thinks that the dogmatist propagation comes at the expense of a
healthy “understanding,” or reason.
Spinoza, like many Enlightenment thinkers who came afterward,
champions reason as the “gold standard” of human cognition.
Accordingly, he is keenly aware of what he perceives as affronts to
reason. Spinoza laments,
I am utterly astonished that men can bring themselves to
make reason, the greatest of all gifts and a light divine,
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subservient to letters that are dead, and may have been
corrupted by human malice; that it should be considered no
crime to denigrate the mind, the true handwriting of God’s
word, declaring it to be corrupt, blind, and lost, whereas it is
considered to be a heinous crime to entertain such thoughts of
the letter, a mere shadow of God’s word. They think it pious
to put no trust in reason and their own judgment, impious to
doubt the trustworthiness of those who have transmitted to us
the Sacred Books. This is not piety, but mere folly. 31
To be sure, Spinoza does think that Scripture can be something of
great value to the multitude, insofar as it inspires love toward fellow
citizens. However, in this passage it is evident that Spinoza has no
sympathy for those who uphold the authority of Scripture (“letters
that are dead”) at the expense of reason (“the true handwriting of
God’s word”). Dogmatists do not condone skepticism toward “the
letter” or toward “those who have transmitted to us the Sacred
Books,” and they consider this unconditional trust to be a virtue.
Spinoza wishes to debunk the false notion of piety that is
equivalent to doctrinal faith. Spinoza dismisses this notion of piety
when he proposes the second version of Divine Law. He adds to this,
claiming that the unquestioning belief in Scriptural narratives is not
constitutive of true theology, and theology’s message does not come
at reason’s expense: “[B]y theology I mean the Word of God properly
so called, which does not consist in a set number of books….[I]f you
look to its purpose and end [i.e., loving one’s neighbor], it will be
found to be in no respect opposed to reason, and is therefore valid for
all men.” 32 More important, Spinoza establishes formally the
respective roles of reason and religion, stating that the former is
concerned with “truth and wisdom” while the latter concerns “piety
and obedience.” 33 As we have seen already in Spinoza’s proposal of
two versions of Divine Law, the assignment of roles to reason and
religion accommodates both philosophers and the unphilosophical
multitude. The key word in this assignment of roles is “obedience.”
This word signifies a shift in the focus of the treatise to Spinoza’s
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political project. Citizens’ obedience to the laws made by the
sovereign power will be crucial to the health of the state. For
Spinoza, the state’s focus should be on inducing this obedience rather
than on intellectual and moral cultivation.
These are fighting words for dogmatists. Religion as it stands in
their view is under attack by Spinoza. The claim that the canon of
sacred texts is irrelevant amounts to a threat to the essence of religion.
After all, the Scripture constitutes the infallible Word of God, and
who could possibly have the nerve to question that? Apparently,
Spinoza does. Although Spinoza does acknowledge the truth of
Scripture’s core message, the love of one’s neighbor, he is skeptical
of the purported infallibility of the specific books of the Bible and
their respective authors. Furthermore, Spinoza warns against taking
the present-day theologians at their word. In Chapter Seven, Spinoza
argues that, opposed to “charity,” theologians “imagine that the most
profound mysteries lie hidden in the Bible, and they exhaust
themselves in unravelling these absurdities while ignoring other
things of value. They ascribe to the Holy Spirit whatever their wild
fancies have invented.” 34 It is just as dangerous to believe
theologians’ faulty interpretations of Scripture not necessarily on
account of the content of the speculative doctrines they profess but
more because they uphold baseless speculation (and “zeal”35 for this
speculation) over moral action.
Spinoza frames the problem of dogmatism in terms of the
respective roles of theology and philosophy. These roles are very
specific, and neither discipline should attempt to go beyond its
competency. Spinoza denounces dogmatism by chastising those who
are afraid to use their reason and dismissing blind faith in Scriptural
narratives as “folly.” 36 As if this were not enough, Spinoza
eventually advances the claim that, to a certain extent, religion should
be subjected to political authority. Fradkin notes that for Spinoza,
“religious opinion is free to be expressed, [but] religious action is still
entirely subject to the sovereign.”37 Spinoza is so dismissive of the
possibility of theology being a speculative discipline that he does not
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care which views concerning the divine that theologians perpetuate as
long as these views are consistent with the love of one’s neighbor. In
turn, the love of one’s neighbor is consistent with the well-being of
the state. Although Spinoza sees the political utility that religion can
have, his complete apathy toward “religious opinion” is a huge slap to
the face for dogmatists.
Dogmatism and Freedom
Just as reason is the gold standard of human cognition, freedom
(especially freedom of thought) is Spinoza’s paragon of political life,
and he defends it vigorously in Chapter 20 of the TTP. 38 In fact,
Spinoza claims that freedom is the “purpose” of the state in the sense
that it should “free every man from fear so that he may live in
security as far as is possible, that is, so that he may best preserve his
own natural right to exist and to act, without harm to himself and to
others.” 39 While it is beyond the scope of this essay to provide an
extensive account of Spinoza’s political philosophy, several important
principles are contained within this short passage. First, Spinoza
mentions that the state exists to “free every man from fear.” Citizens’
freedom from fear is a necessary precondition for stability, and this
generates feelings of “security.” Second, Spinoza declares freedom
“to exist and to act” as a “natural right.” The state exists to maintain
human beings’ natural rights. Specifically, the state protects citizens’
power of self-preservation. Third, Spinoza adds the caveat that the
state maintains the freedom of its citizens only when citizens act
“without harm” toward themselves or other people. Thus, for
Spinoza, security and stability are the ends of the state, and freedom
in a very basic sense acts as a means to these ends.
The third point, the boundaries of freedom, is crucial and
most closely related to dogmatism. Spinoza builds on this:
[W]hile to act against the sovereign’s decree is definitely an
infringement of his right, this is not the case with thinking,
judging, and consequently with speaking, too, provided one
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does no more than express or communicate one’s opinion,
defending it through rational conviction alone, not through
deceit, anger, hatred, or the will to effect such changes in the
state as he himself decides. 40
There are limits on freedom, in Spinoza’s view, and these limits most
often take the form of prohibiting certain actions (i.e., “to act against
the sovereign’s decree”) and even some speech. One can see that hate
speech falls among the prohibited because of the threat to social
stability that it carries. Dogmatists have been known to verbally
denounce people of other faiths and occasionally act violently toward
them, and this is not acceptable in Spinoza’s state. Another limit on
freedom of speech pertains to the way opinions are defended. It is
important to note that Spinoza only allows for rational defense of
opinions in his political arrangement. This is a win for philosophers,
as Spinoza has repeated throughout the work that the multitude is
primarily irrational and bound by superstition. The rational can
defend their opinions openly, but those who argue using “deceit,
anger, hatred,” or seditious ideas are silenced. Of course, the
reasonableness of this expectation may be contested, especially
because most people are indeed irrational in Spinoza’s view; but, in
theory, the state could intervene in extreme cases. In effect, this
spells trouble for dogmatists because they cannot resort to blind faith
to advance their interests, and any who attempt to use force to
promote their agenda already are stifled by the state’s laws that
punish militant behavior.
The limitations that Spinoza imposes on political freedom (i.e., in
actions prohibited by law as well as in specific instances of speech
detrimental to the well-being of the state) are in essence a method for
reducing the influence of religious leaders on political life, as they are
the ones who want to limit freedom of thought, the most important
freedom for Spinoza. 41 Mignini ascribes to Spinoza a negative
attitude toward all of theology: “Spinoza’s judgement about
theology…is thus clear and unequivocally negative: not only are the
theologians enemies of reason and freedom…but they are equally
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against those who, appointed to govern states, refuse to use theology
as an instrument of power.” 42
If by “theology” we are referring to religious belief, then this
assessment is accurate. Spinoza does not concern himself with
religious “opinion” because he believes it irrelevant. On the other
hand, we must take into account Spinoza’s definition of theology that
he provides in his second version of the Divine Law as well as in the
chapter detailing the roles of theology and philosophy. Theology
involves “piety” or “obedience”; it does not involve speculative
matters. Also, for the sake of clarity, it seems that “instrument of
power” in this quotation constitutes control of citizens’ thoughts
rather than control of their actions. This is a warped kind of
obedience not in line with Spinoza’s political project. Dogmatism is
characterized by the emphasis on having the “correct” thoughts about
the divine. Thus, we could rephrase this in terms of dogmatism rather
than theology, and the assessment makes more sense.
Spinoza’s conception of religion as presented in the two versions
of the Divine Law is a limited religion, and it can be used as a tool for
achieving stability and freedom in society. In support of this
interpretation, Jobani remarks, “The core of religion is thus the
creation, preservation, and cultivation of stability, which is also the
ultimate goal of politics. Religion, according to the Treatise, is thus
distinct from superstition, not by dint of the truth of its concept of
God, but only by virtue of its ability to stabilize society.” 43 Spinoza’s
type of religion enables the achievement of “the ultimate goal of
politics” through redirecting the multitude’s superstition toward
obedience to the sovereign power. One may raise the following
objection: Isn’t Spinoza limiting freedom dramatically by not
allowing interpretations of Scripture contrary to the doctrine of
charity? In short, yes; but, he is simultaneously increasing freedom
from fear (i.e., the precondition for stability and security) by
attenuating dogmatism and consequently increasing the freedom to
philosophize because the latter depends on this more basic freedom.
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Conclusion
Although Spinoza may not have influenced the American
Founding Fathers directly, Spinoza is often considered one of the first
major proponents of liberal democracy, and the United States
emulates this form of government. In light of this fact and
considering the contemporary persistence of religious dogmatism in
the United States, it is worth pondering whether the Spinozistic
political project to re-channel superstition and promote security and
stability has been or could be successful. Rice notes that the
“political dangers of speculative theology, the threats to freedom of
inquiry, the rule of the mob rather than of reason…[are] no less a
threat to freedom and human liberation today than they were in
Spinoza’s time.” 44 Would Spinoza have foreseen our current state of
affairs—that is, with respect to dogmatism refusing to relinquish its
grip entirely on a considerable number of individuals?
Regardless of the answer to this question, we can learn a great
deal from Spinoza’s account of religion that is presented in the
Theological-Political Treatise. It is evident that dogmatism is a
complex issue with acute sociopolitical implications. If Spinoza’s
account of the human condition and superstition is accurate, then it
may be impossible to eliminate dogmatism once and for all.
Nevertheless, Spinoza holds out hope that at least we may be able to
weaken dogmatism’s negative influence on the public through a state
that is strong but at the same time preserves freedom of thought.
While my view is not wholly consistent with Spinoza’s project,
despite Spinoza’s pessimism about the human condition, I would
argue that everyone could benefit from improved education. Openmindedness about and scrutiny of religious beliefs must not remain a
social taboo. If we can alleviate the discomfort that tends to pervade
religious discussions, then we will be in a better position to combat
intolerance effectively.
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